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Abstract
Despite its current surplus and growing Trust Fund, the US Social 
Security system is in long-term imbalance due to projected population 
aging. The standard 75 year Summary Actuarial Balance indicates that 
solvency could be restored by raising payroll taxes by 1.86 (all figures 
are expressed as a percentage of taxable payroll). However, this would
not put it on a sustainable basis; the projected Trust Fund would fall 
rapidly, and within 80 years would cross zero on its way down. This 
paper develops measures of the cost of making Social Security 
sustainable. We consider estimates of balance over an infinite horizon, 
based on different strategies of extending the projections past 75 
years. These indicate imbalances of 3.1 to 3.7% of the present value of
payroll, considerably greater than 1.86%. Because of the complexities 
and uncertainties of these infinite horizon measures, however, we 
suggest a simpler commonsense measure: the tax increase necessary 
to make the Trust Fund Ratio constant at the end of the forecast 
horizon, specifically, between the 74th and 75th years. Its advantage is
the ease of calculation. All the information necessary to calculate this 
measure is available from the annual Trustees Report, and no 
projection or assumption past the 75-year horizon is required. Under 
certain assumptions, the measure is numerically equal to one of the 
infinite horizon measures. Under the Trustees’ projection assumptions, 
it indicates 3.1% imbalance. Under assumptions of more rapid 
mortality decline, the imbalance is 4.2%. Either way, sustainability 
measures indicate that the system is in much greater imbalance than 
is currently thought. 
Introduction
Despite its current surplus and growing Trust Fund, the US Social 
Security system is in long-term imbalance, primarily due to future 
population aging ushered in by the retirement of the baby boom 
generations. According to the most recent Trustees report (Board of 
Trustees 2001), the Office of the Actuary of the Social Security 
Administration (SSA) projects that even with legislated increases in the
normal retirement age in the coming decades, the Trust Fund will be 
exhausted in 2038. Around the world, the financial outlook for public 
pension programs is bleak.  The common underlying factors are 
increased life expectancy, low or falling fertility, and lower ages at 
retirement. Compared with 20 OECD nations, the US long term 
imbalance is relatively small, less than one-third to one half of their 
typical imbalances(Roseveare et al, 1996)1. However, it is nonetheless 
a prominent problem that attracts a great deal of attention from 
politicians, policy analysts, academics, and the general public. 
Indeed, in the US, the long-run financial problems of Social Security are
once again in the news and on the political agenda.  Why can’t Social 
Security be fixed and stay fixed? One reason is the way we commonly 
measure long-term financial balance in the system. The most 
prominent measure of long-run solvency of the Trust Fund, and the 
most common test of proposed policies, is the 75-Year Actuarial 
Balance. Unfortunately, it has serious limitations for this purpose 
because it assesses solvency only over a 75-year horizon. Fixing the 
system according to this criterion, while it would ensure its balance for 
the initial 75 years, would leave it in serious imbalance thereafter. 
Furthermore, since one year from now, the end date of the 75-year 
horizon will have moved a year farther into the future period of deficit 
spending, the newly calculated 75-Year Actuarial Balance will find even
a “fixed” system to be newly out of balance. This measurement 
problem can be solved by constructing measures that require 
sustainability beyond the 75-year horizon, perhaps even over an 
infinite horizon. Such measures can also be used to evaluate 
competing policy proposals for restoring solvency. 
Infinitely many policies are consistent with sustainable Social Security. 
Some of these would raise taxes immediately and build up a large trust
1 Imbalance is measured as the present value of future taxes minus future benefits, 
plus initial assets, divided by GDP in 1994. Calculations are presented for real 
discount rates of 3, 5, and 7%, and rates of productivity growth of 1, 1.5, and 2%. 
Comparisons reported in the text were for a discount rate of 3% and productivity 
growth rate of 1%, corresponding to the assumptions of the Trustees Report (2000). 
The reported imbalance for the US is 62% of GDP. For Belgium, Norway, Portugal and 
Sweden it is over 200%, and for New Zealand and Denmark it is over 300%.
fund so as to avoid additional tax increases in the future. Others might 
raise taxes slowly, ending up with higher taxes for future generations 
than under the immediate tax increase policies. Still others might do 
nothing for now, leading to a large trust fund debt. This also could be a
sustainable policy, provided that it included a plan to raise taxes in the
future, in order to stabilize the trust fund debt. These various policies 
would imply very different patterns of intergenerational transfers. We 
do not argue here for one or another of these. Our point is only that 
the choice of policy should be made with eyes open to the longer run 
future. Any proposed policy should provide explicitly for the indefinite 
continuation of the system beyond the initial 75-year horizon. 
Some reform proposals involve privatization and/or investment in 
equities. We do not consider such proposals here. Instead, we focus on 
proposals that keep the current structure of Social Security: a partially 
funded tax and transfer program, with the fund invested in US 
Treasury bonds. Such proposals might change taxes (raising the rate, 
removing the cap) or benefits (reducing the COLA, raising normal 
retirement age, indexing benefits to life expectancy, making benefits 
need-based). For simplicity sake, we will discuss only changes in taxes,
but the extension to changes in benefits is simple and straightforward. 
Measuring the Imbalance: Limits of the 75-Year 
Actuarial Balance Measure
How big is the imbalance in the long-term finances of the Social 
Security system (OASDI)? The most commonly used measure is the 75-
Year Actuarial Balance. Virtually all the plans that have been proposed 
by politicians and analysts are based on this measure, and discussions 
in the media revolve around it as well. The 75-year Actuarial Balance 
equals the current amount in the trust fund, plus the present value of 
projected taxes minus expenditures over the next 75 years, minus the 
present value of one year’s projected costs in 75 years, all expressed 
as a percentage of the present value of projected taxable payroll over 
the next 75 years. According to the year 2000 estimate by the Social 
Security Office of the Actuary the 75-year Actuarial Balance is 1.89%. 
That is, the payroll tax rate would need to be raised by 1.89 
percentage points, from its current level of 12.4% to 14.29%, in order 
to achieve long-term actuarial balance (Board of Trustees 2000)2.  If 
2 According to the most recent report (year 2001), the 75-year Summary Actuarial 
Balance is 1.86%.  This slight improvement (+0.03%) is primary due to the use of 
updated data on birth rate and immigration rate in demographic assumptions.  See 
section IV.B.7 “Reasons for Change in Actuarial Balance from Last Report” and Table 
IV.B9 (Board of Trustees 2001, pages 64-66) for detailed discussion on the changes in
assumptions between two reports.  Throughout the analysis, we have used the 
information from the 2000 Trustees report, instead of the 2001 report. This is 
because the elaborate program we use to generate deterministic and stochastic 
2
the payroll tax rate were immediately and permanently raised by this 
amount, then there would be sufficient funds to make all necessary 
expenditures over the next 75 years, and to have a trust fund equal to 
one year’s costs at the end of this period. 
This measure indicates whether the system will remain solvent over 
the remaining lifetime of almost all participants currently contributing 
to the system. In 75 years, surviving contributors currently age 20 
would be age 95. The difficulty is that even with the payroll increase of 
1.89% indicated by the 75-year Actuarial Balance, after 79 years the 
Trust Fund would be exhausted and taxes would cover only 78% of 
projected costs. Then the payroll tax rate would have to be raised by a 
further 4.3 percentage points to 18.6% in order to cover costs, or 
benefits would have to be cut correspondingly (TR2000: 171-2)3. After 
75 years, the system would be in a far more precarious situation than 
it is now. For this reason, some analysts have called for additional 
measures of the long-term soundness of the system (1999 Technical 
Panel:10, 28).  
Figure 1 illustrates this problem. It plots the projected Trust Fund level 
under the current tax rate, and after a 1.89% increase, over the next 
80 years. Since it would take about 4.5 years to exhaust the final 
balance equal to one year’s costs (1/(1-.78) = 4.5), the trust fund 
would hit 0 between 2079 and 2080, and would drop increasingly 
rapidly thereafter. 
<< Figure 1 around here>>
Here is a different way to look at the same point: Each year, the 
Trustees issue a new Report which updates the 75-year Actuarial 
Balance. Each new Balance includes one more year of deficit far in the 
future, when expenditures exceed tax revenues, and the previous 
year’s actuarial balance grows by the interest rate. For this reason, 
referred to as “change in the valuation period”, each year the new 
Balance tends to be worse than the previous4. The year 2001 report 
indicates that the “change in the valuation period” since the previous 
year’s report resulted in a worsening of the 75-year Actuarial Balance 
by .07% (TR 2001:65). Under the Trustees Report’s assumptions, this 
Social Security projections has built into it the assumptions of the 2000 Trustees 
Report. 
3 The payroll tax rate is currently set at 12.4%. However, taxes on benefits generate 
additional revenues, so that the current tax income is 12.65% of payroll rather than 
12.4%. By 2075, this is projected to rise to 13.34% (all numbers based on 
TR2000:Table III.A.2). The calculations reported in this paragraph reflect this 
increased revenue from taxes on benefits. 
4 Since there are other changes, which also alter the AB75, the net result from all 
causes may be either improvement or deterioration.
source of change is a certain and completely predictable result of the 
passage of an additional year, and is a consequence of choosing a 
finite horizon. Although the size of the annual change is small, it is 
repeated systematically year after year, and so it cumulates. Based on 
the last twelve Trustees Reports, the cumulated change since 1989 
due to valuation period is .74. The size of the changes has increased 
steadily over that period, and will presumably be larger in the coming 
decade. Since this deterioration in the 75-year Actuarial Balance is 
predictable, it should be possible to construct a measure which reflects
it in advance, and therefore does not change over time as the horizon 
is shifted farther into the future.
The most recent Technical Advisory Panel for Social Security endorsed 
this kind of concern with “sustainability” over the longer term.  Stating 
that “emphasis on the 75-year actuarial balance is misleading,” the 
panel noted that “many designers of reform try to reach balance 
simply by targeting their plans only at the 75-year actuarial deficit  … 
[and] … usually end up in a situation where their reforms only last a 
year before being shown out of 75-year balance again.” (1999:28) 
However, the panel also recognized that “there is no way to 
demonstrate long term patterns of sustainability….” (1999:28).  This 
paper attempts to fill this gap. 
A Simple Criterion for Social Security Sustainability: 
The Flat Fund Ratio 
As a first step to address the sustainability of Social Security, we 
suggest a simple common-sense criterion: the Trust Fund Ratio should 
be constant or flat at the end of the 75-year projection horizon, or 
equivalently that the Trust Fund should be growing at the same rate as
Costs. We call this the “Flat Fund Ratio” criterion, and the Flat Fund 
Ratio tax is the constant payroll tax rate that would be necessary to 
achieve a Flat Fund Ratio at the end of the projection horizon. The 
difference between the current tax rate and the Flat Fund Ratio tax 
rate is a measure of the imbalance in the system, expressed as a 
proportion of the present value of payroll. It is directly comparable to 
the current 75-year Actuarial Balance measure. It appears that this 
criterion, or one like it, was used to assess the proposals of the 1994-
96 Advisory Council (Goss, 1999:25). To maintain the Trust Fund Ratio 
constant at the end of the forecast period, the Fund must be just large 
enough so that the interest earned on the Fund is large enough to 
make up the difference between the costs and the tax revenues, plus 
enough to make the Fund grow at exactly the rate that costs grow, so 
that it will be able to do the same in the next year as well. 
The Flat Fund Ratio Criterion requires that F(t)/C(t) be constant over 
time in the neighborhood of some designated year T, which we will 
generally take to be 75 years after the projection baseline, consistent 
with the horizon used by the Trustees. Note that if it is constant 
between, say, 2074 and 2075, that does not imply that it will be 
constant thereafter; in general it will not. The condition implies that 
F(T) must grow at the same rate as C(T), say , or that
. We can also express F(T+1) in terms of the flows 
into and out of the system between T and T+1, yielding:
, where  is the taxable payroll in 
year T, is the current payroll tax rate,  is some unknown increase in 
the payroll tax rate, which is assumed to be implemented in year T, 
and r is the rate of interest earned on the trust fund. Equating the two 
expressions for F(T+1), we find that to keep the fund/expenditure ratio 
constant between time T and T+1 requires:
1) .
Taking  as given, we can solve this for the tax increase, , which 
would be necessary to keep the fund ratio constant around time T if it 
were instituted starting in year T. If the fund is projected to be zero at 
T, then will be the tax increase necessary to make tax revenues 
equal costs in year T. Otherwise, interest on the fund, whether positive
or negative, must be taken into account. 
To illustrate the use of equation 1), suppose that current policy were 
maintained through 2075. To achieve sustainability thereafter, the 
necessary payroll tax rate starting in 2075 would be 23%, a 10.5% 
increase. In this case, the payroll tax increase must be large enough to
pay interest on the large Trust Fund deficit that would have been 
accumulated if current policy were maintained. Alternatively, suppose 
that the payroll tax were immediately and permanently increased by 
1.89%. Then to achieve sustainability after 2075, the payroll tax rate 
would have to be raised by 6 percentage points to 18.4%, requiring an 
additional tax rate increase of 4.1%, on top of the original 1.89%. In 
this case, the Fund would be projected to be near zero in 2075, so the 
tax increase brings tax revenues up to meet costs.
More to the point, however, we would like to calculate the tax increase 
necessary to achieve a flat fund ratio at T if it were instituted 
immediately, rather than in 2075. In this case, a current change in 
taxes will also change the fund balance at time T, so that  should 
be treated as a function of the tax rate: , where the tax 
rate is understood to be constant up to time T. We can now consider a 
permanent increase in the tax rate that is instituted today, call it , as 
opposed to  which is a tax imposed starting at time T. The difficulty in
applying the condition above is that we do not know , which 
will depend on the present value of payroll up to time , . The
Appendix derives the equation for  in terms of the fund balance 
projected under the current tax regime, , and the present value of 
payroll over the forecast horizon, , as follows:
2)
Estimate of Flat Fund Ratio Tax Based on Trustees 
Report
All the items on the right side of equation 2) can be found in the 
Trustees Report for any recent year, or calculated from data in it, using
either nominal or constant dollar values. , the growth rate of costs, 
can be calculated as . The present value of taxable 
payroll is calculated using the projected value of payroll for each year 
through T. 
Using the year 2000 Trustees Report, we find  is 3.1%. This means 
that in order to achieve a projected Trust Fund Ratio in 2075 equal to 
the Ratio in 2074, it would be necessary to raise the payroll tax rate 
immediately from 12.4% to 15.5%. This is in contrast to the 1.89% 
which would be required to achieve long run balance according to the 
conventional 75-year Summary Actuarial Balance measure. Note that 
both criteria use projections over the same 75-year horizon, and 
neither makes any implicit or explicit assumption about what happens 
after 2075. 
Figure 2 plots projected Trust Fund Ratios through 2100, based on the 
year 2000 Trustees Report assumptions, which are here assumed to 
continue to hold from 2075 to 2100. As expected, we see that the 
Ratio falls to zero in 2037 under current policy, and that it falls to zero 
in 2078 if the payroll tax rate is immediately raised by 1.89%. We also 
see that if the payroll tax rate is immediately raised by 3.1%, then the 
Ratio rises until 2074, and remains constant at this peak value in 2075,
meeting the Flat Fund Ratio criterion. However, thereafter it begins to 
decline. We see that the Flat Fund Ratio criterion does not insure long 
run sustainability, if the Trustees Report assumptions are continued 
into the future. It is a weak definition of sustainability, yielding a low 
estimate of the tax increase needed for sustainability. This observation
suggests that we should explore more rigorously the conditions 
necessary for a truly sustainable system, and the relation of the Flat 
Fund Criterion to such conditions. 
Infinite Horizon Measures of Sustainability
Although the Flat Fund Ratio criterion has a common sense appeal, it is
ad hoc and the choice of a 75-year horizon is arbitrary. Extension of 
the Actuary’s calculations of Summary Actuarial Balance for horizons 
longer than 75 years shows that the imbalance continues to rise as the
horizon lengthens, still growing slowly after 300 years. In this section 
we will consider three strategies for carrying out infinite horizon 
calculations of balance, and show that the Flat Fund Ratio criterion is 
equivalent to one of these strategies. 
Prior to 1965 the Actuaries assessed solvency over an infinite horizon 
or “in perpetuity” (Myers 1959). After 1965, the infinite horizon was 
replaced by a 75 year horizon on the recommendation of the Advisory 
Council (Goss 1999:19). According to Goss this had a relatively small 
effect on the long run cost projections at that time, because costs were
projected to remain flat in any case, rather than rising exponentially as
they do now. Starting in 1973, the projections began to assume a 
changing time path for earnings and benefits, since new legislation 
linked benefits to past earnings. Currently, a variety of measures is 
employed. While the projected date of fund exhaustion and the 75 year
actuarial balance are best known and most influential, many other 
figures for the short, medium and long run are also calculated and 
presented. However, no current measure is similar to the former 
infinite-horizon measure. 
There is good reason to require balance over an infinite horizon. Social 
Security is structured in a very particular way. Financing current 
benefits largely out of taxes on current workers automatically creates 
new obligations to pay benefits in the future. The young generation 
that pays benefits to the old generation must itself be supported in its 
old age by the next young generation. Social Security is built on the 
concept of linked benefits and contributions across generations over 
an infinite time horizon. The net obligations at any moment to those 
who have paid in but not yet received benefits are the system’s 
implicit debt and the program could not be shut down without either 
canceling the implicit debt – a policy that no one recommends – or 
providing for its repayment.  Thus, as long as one considers policies to 
continue Social Security in its current form, assessment and balance 
over an infinite horizon are not only appropriate but necessary5. In this 
regard, our approach is quite similar to Generational Accounting.6 
The most direct approach to the infinite horizon assessment is to 
continue the 75-year projection farther into the future, say for 300 or 
500 years, when the power of discounting would render further 
extension irrelevant. This extended projection can be achieved by 
simply continuing the long run rates of covered wage growth and real 
interest rates assumed for the 75-year horizon. For the demography, 
the values of fertility, mortality, and immigration assumed at the end 
of the 75-year horizon can likewise be continued. This is the approach 
used in Generational Accounting, which also requires very long 
forecast horizons (see Auerbach et al 1999). Goss (1999) reports an 
infinite horizon actuarial balance of –4.7% based on the assumptions of
the 1996 Trustees Report7. The Infinite Horizon imbalance in the 
system would then be 4.7% of the present value of payroll, in contrast 
to the 2.19% of payroll indicated by the 75-year Actuarial Balance 
calculation in the 1996 report. 
Although this approach is straightforward, many people already 
believe that the 75-year horizon is too distant to be meaningful, and 
that detailed projections over longer horizons suggest a false precision.
A simpler projection assumption is that after 75 years (or some other 
interval, T), the system will have settled into a steady state in which 
rates of growth of costs and tax revenues are thereafter constant, 
although not necessarily equal.  That is, after T years, the tax income 
in year t, , and the costs in year t, , grow at constant 
exponential rates  and , respectively. With this assumption, we can 
work from the situation at the end of the detailed projection (for 
example, after T=75 years), using the information published in the 
5 Some policy alternatives such as privatizing Social Security and replacing it with a 
system of funded private retirement accounts do not require an infinite time horizon 
since they generally include a plan for repayment of this implicit debt.   
6 Like Generational Accounting (Auerbach et al, 1991; Auerbach et al, 1999) we start 
with the premise that the budget must be balanced over an infinite horizon, and 
consider the kinds of policy changes that would be required to achieve this balance. 
Our approach also differs in a number of ways. Generational Accounting is based on 
generations, while we focus on periods. Generational Accounting is applied in a 
comprehensive way to government budgets, whereas we only examine Social 
Security finances. These differences arise from the practicalities of implementation 
rather than from important conceptual differences. 
7 Although details are not given, it appears that Goss calculated the 500-year 
Actuarial Balance from extended projections of this sort. We have replicated this 
result by extending our population projection out for 300 years based on the 1996 
Trustees Report assumptions, and then after year 75, assuming that the tax income 
per person 20-64 continues to grow at the same exponential rate as observed at 75 
years, and that the benefit per person 65+ likewise continues to grow at the same 
exponential rate thereafter.
Trustees Report, without extending the detailed projection beyond T. 
We could seek a specific one-time, immediate and permanent payroll 
tax rate increase  that would achieve actuarial balance over the 
infinite horizon under this steady-state condition.  would then 
measure the Social Security imbalance as a proportion of the present 
value of payroll over the infinite horizon, in a manner exactly 
analogous to the currently used 75-year Actuarial Balance measure. 
The Appendix derives the following expression for : 
3)  
First consider the general case, in which the growth rates of costs and 
tax revenues differ (  ). Calculating these from the last two years of
the Trustees 75-year projection period we find that tax revenues grow 
at 1.16% per year, while costs grow more rapidly at 1.47% per 
year. One cause of this discrepancy is the projected continuation of 
mortality decline, which leads to an ever-rising old-age dependency 
ratio as we will discuss below. When these growth rates are not equal, 
we will call the resulting calculation of imbalance the Unstable Infinite 
Horizon imbalance.
In the other case, growth rates of payroll and costs are equal (=). 
The Trustees’ projections indicate that under current policy, tax 
revenues will cover only two thirds of costs in 2075. Under this 
assumption, the proportional gap would remain constant thereafter 
under current policy. We will call the resulting calculation of imbalance 
the Stable Infinite Horizon imbalance. Under this condition, equation 3)
is slightly simplified, and becomes8:
8 While the mathematical expression below is not transparent, the intuition is very 
simple. According to Trustees’ projections, a tax increase in 2000 of 1.89% would 
result in a Trust Fund near zero in 2075, at which point costs would exceed tax 
revenues by 4.29% of payroll. If this gap were to remain constant thereafter (which is
the assumption that =), then a further tax increase of 4.29% would balance the 
system over the infinite horizon. The Stable Infinite Horizon imbalance measure 
would equal the immediate and permanent tax increase  that generates revenues 
with the same present value as the two step tax increase just described.
4) 
Comparison shows that this is identical to Equation 2) for the Flat Fund 
Ratio . The Appendix shows that any system that is balanced over an 
infinite horizon and is stable from time T must have a constant Trust 
Fund Ratio from time T, thus satisfying the Flat Fund Ratio criterion. 
We can conclude that the commonsensical Flat Fund Ratio criterion, 
which requires no projection or equivalent assumptions past the 
Trustees’ projection horizon, would be numerically equivalent to the 
infinite horizon measure under the assumption that the growth rates of
payroll and costs were constant and equal after the Trustees’ 
projection horizon. This observation clarifies the meaning of the Flat 
Fund Ratio criterion. It also suggests why the Trust Fund Ratio declines
after 2075 in Figure 2, even after the tax increase indicated by the Flat
Fund Ratio criterion:  does not equal  so the stable assumption is not
met. While the indicated tax increase does make equal the Fund Ratio 
in 2074 and 2075, thereafter the ratio declines since costs grow more 
rapidly than tax revenues. 
The second and fourth columns of Table 1 present measures of 
imbalance, based on the Trustees’ projection assumptions. The 
Trustees’ main measure of imbalance is the 75-year Summary 
Actuarial Balance, which in the year 2000 report was 1.89%. As already
discussed, the Flat Fund Ratio measure is 3.1%, which equals the 
Stable Infinite Horizon measure. For the more realistic Unstable Infinite
Horizon measure, which acknowledges that after 2075, costs grow 
more rapidly than payroll, we find 3.7%. Finally, if we simply continue a
more detailed projection over a 300 year horizon, we find 3.5%. All 
these alternative measures of imbalance are substantially greater than
the conventional measure. 
<< Table 1 about here>>
These measures are expressed relative to the present value of payroll, 
but we can also express them in current dollars. The 75-year Summary
Actuarial Balance measure is multiplied times the present value of 
payroll through 2075, yielding 3.08 trillion dollars. A cash infusion of 
this amount today would keep the system afloat until 2075, according 
to the Actuaries’ projections. The Flat Fund Ratio measure also has a 
75 year horizon, since projections are not continued past this point. 
Over this horizon, the imbalance is 5.05 trillion dollars, or 64% greater.
The Stable Infinite Horizon measure is identical over the 75 year 
horizon, but over the infinite horizon, the present value of imbalance is
6.90 trillion dollars. The Unstable Infinite Horizon measure is higher 
still, at 8.37 trillion. The 300 year horizon calculation has a slightly 
lower imbalance at 7.76 trillion, because the long run demography 
implies a slowing of the rate of increase of costs, as we discuss in the 
next section. 
Demography in the Very Long Run
Consider the behavior of very long run demographic projections in 
relation to the stable and unstable infinite horizon assumptions. Most 
long-term demographic projections assume that fertility will remain 
constant at some level after a short initial period of transition, and 
assume that the annual flow of net immigrants will be a constant 
number. Mortality, however, is often projected to continue to decline 
indefinitely, in the sense that it is still declining at the end of the 
forecast horizon. 
In the long run, survival to age 65 will approach 1.0; it is already 
projected by the Actuaries to be .87 for the generation born in 2000 
(sexes combined, cohort projection). The US Total Fertility Rate is 
projected by the Actuaries to approach 1.95, which would lead 
eventually to population decline if there were no net immigration. Net 
immigration is assumed to remain constant at roughly 1 million per 
year (Board of Trustees, 2001). As time passes, the population up to 
age 65 will increase or decrease until the net immigration flow is just 
sufficient to offset the natural decrease due to low fertility. At that 
point, the population below age 65 will reach a steady state age 
distribution, with constant size. 
Now consider the population above age 65, Pop(65+). Each year, it will
be augmented by an inflow equal to the number of 64-year olds in the 
previous year, a number which eventually will be constant from year to
year, call it Pop(65). Assume that all net immigrants arrive or depart 
before the age of 65.  Then the size of Pop(65+) will approximately 
equal this inflow times the life expectancy at age 65, e65. Since e65 will 
continue to increase, so will Pop(65+), and so will the old age 
dependency ratio. Vaupel (1986) has shown that if age-specific death 
rates continue to decline at a constant proportional rate over the long 
term, then e65 will eventually rise at a constant linear rate. In 
particular, if mortality at all ages over 65 declines at 1% per year, then
e65 will rise at approximately 1 year per decade. A constant linear 
increase in e65 will imply a declining proportional rate of increase in e65, 
eventually approaching zero as the centuries pass9. 
9 By arguments given in Vaupel (1986), we know that e65(t) will be increasing by 
roughly .1 years for each one year increase in t. After 300 years, e65 will be roughly 
30 years greater. Since e65(2000) is about 18 years, an increment of .1 years per year
We can conclude that for a long time, the growth rate of the elderly 
population, and therefore of costs, will exceed the growth rate of the 
working age population and therefore of covered wages and tax 
revenues. Therefore the stable assumption is initially wrong, and will 
underestimate the pressures on the system. In the very long run, 
however, the assumption of equal rates of change of taxes and 
expenditures is appropriate, but this convergence occurs at a slower 
rate than observed initially (say in 2075), and during the transition to 
the long run, a larger gap between taxes and expenditures opens up 
due to the slowing of population growth, increasing e65, and 
consequent population aging. These points are confirmed by a 
demographic projection over a 300 year horizon.10
We will present results calculated according to each of these 
strategies. However, our general view is that there is little value in 
spinning out over several centuries the implications of detailed 
demographic assumptions that are so fragile. A slight change in the 
assumptions for fertility or immigration would have a large effect on 
the outcome. The appeal of the stable and unstable assumptions is 
that they are rough and simple, and can be implemented from existing
projections. We expect that the stable assumption will lead to an 
underestimate of the imbalance, while the unstable assumption will 
lead to an overestimate, for the reasons just discussed.
How Fast Will Mortality Decline?
Many analysts believe that the Intermediate mortality assumption of 
the Trustees Report represents an unrealistically slow rate of mortality 
decline (Stoto and Durch, 1993; Technical Panel Report, 1999: 3, 22, 
64-67; Lee and Miller, 2001). Lee and Carter (1992) developed a new 
method for forecasting mortality, which projected life expectancy gains
at almost double the rate projected by the Social Security Actuaries at 
that time. These Lee-Carter forecasts are incorporated in new 
stochastic and deterministic population forecasts by Lee and 
Tuljapurkar (1994 and 2000). Although the Actuaries have raised their 
life expectancy forecast slightly in response to the recommendation of 
initially contributes a growth rate of .1/18 = .55%. In 2075, e65 may be about 25 
years, and the growth rate will have fallen to .40%. After 300 years, e65 may be 48 
years, and the growth rate will then be only .1/48 = .2%. Thus the elderly population 
will continue to grow after the working age population has ceased to grow, and its 
growth rate will initially (in 2075) exceed that of the working age population by about
.4%, which will be halved after another 225 years. 
10 The projection shows the rate of growth of the 65+ population declining from .69% 
per year in 2075, to .14% per year in the year 2300. Over this same period, the 
growth rate of the working age population declines from .14% per year to .05% per 
year. Neither remains constant, obviously, and the difference between the two 
decreases from .55% initially to .09% in 2300.
the Technical Advisory Panel (Board of Trustees, 2000), their forecast 
of gains is still substantially below the recommendation and the Lee-
Carter forecast. An updated application of the Lee-Carter method 
forecasts life expectancy in 2075 of 85.9 years, for sexes combined, in 
contrast to just under 83 in the 2000 Trustees Report.  If mortality 
follows the Lee-Carter path, then the system imbalance will be greater 
in 2075, with a larger deficit and a greater Trust Fund debt. In addition,
the elderly population will be growing more rapidly in 2075 than under 
the Actuaries’ projections, at .74% versus .49%, with other 
demographic assumptions unchanged.
Table 1 also presents estimates of imbalance that are based on the 
Lee-Carter mortality forecast but otherwise with the same projection 
assumptions as the first column, identical to the year 2000 Trustees 
Report. These estimates were made using the MVR-Berkeley Social 
Security simulation program in deterministic mode (unpublished runs; 
see Lee and Tuljapurkar, 2000.11 The third column shows how much 
the imbalance increases with more rapid mortality decline. The 75-year
Actuarial Balance measure is .5% higher, and the gap is larger for the 
sustainability measures, rising to 1.1%, then 2.0%. The sustainability 
criteria attach more weight to events far in the future compared to the 
75-year measure, although they discount the future at the same rate. 
Further Aspects of Sustainability Policies
We have proposed measures of long run imbalance, expressed as the 
immediate, constant and perpetual tax increase that would be needed 
to achieve balance. However, these are just measures, and balance 
could be restored by an infinite variety of trajectories of altered tax or 
benefit adjustments. With minor modification, Equations 1, 3 and 4 can
be used to calculate a sustainable tax rate starting at any future date, 
given a projected fund balance for that date. More specifically, for any 
proposed tax and benefit trajectories up to 2075, the implied Fund 
balance in 2075 could be calculated, and the tax increase needed for 
sustainability could then be found. Each trajectory of taxes and 
benefits has a different implication for intergenerational transfers. One 
simple policy would be to have tax rates increase linearly from now 
until 2075, ending in a tax rate in that year that would be sustainable 
thereafter under the stable infinite horizon assumption. The equations 
can be used to find that the terminal tax rate in 2075 and thereafter 
would be 17.7% of payroll under the Trustees Report assumptions. 
Figure 3 plots the Trust Fund Ratio under various tax rate regimes from
2000 to 2099, using the Lee-Tuljapurkar projections with more rapid 
mortality decline. Under the current legislation scenario, the Fund 
11 The program can be run on the web at http://simsoc.demog.berkeley.edu).
Ratio peaks in 2013 and declines to zero in 2034, a little sooner than 
under the Actuaries’ assumptions. With a tax increase of 2.4%, which 
is the 75-year Actuarial Balance under the Lee-Tuljapurkar projections, 
the Ratio would peak around 2020 and decline to zero in 2078. With a 
tax increase of 4.2% to meet the Flat Fund Ratio criterion of balance, 
the ratio would peak in 2074-2075. By construction, it is flat between 
these two dates. If the Stable assumption were true, then the fund 
ratio would remain constant thereafter, but Figure 3 shows that it is 
projected to decline after 2075, as in Figure 2. If the tax is raised 
above 4.5%, as under the 300-year Actuarial Balance measure (4.6% 
increase) and the Unstable Infinite Horizon measure (5.7% increase), 
then the fund ratio continues to rise throughout the 21st century. The 
rapid and continuing increase in the Trust Fund Ratio under the 
Unstable Infinite Horizon tax is unappealing and politically unrealistic. 
It continues to rise in order to provide for a long run future in which the
old age dependency ratio is expected to continue to increase. 
Figure 3 also shows that under the linear increase policy, the fund ratio
would remain remarkably flat throughout the century, particularly after
2045, tracking the increase in costs quite closely, at a ratio of about 
3.5. At this ratio, interest from the fund covers about 10% of annual 
costs. 
<< Figure 3 about here>>
As one might imagine, the sizes of future Trust Fund implied by these 
sustainable tax scenarios are impressively high. Under current 
unsustainable policy, Social Security would accumulate a debt of 29 
trillion dollars (2000) by 2075, if it had the authority to borrow, an 
amount just equal to projected GDP. With the more rapid mortality 
decline, that would rise to 36 trillion. If taxes were immediately raised 
by 1.89%, then by construction a Trust Fund equal to one year’s cost 
would be accumulated, or 1.45 trillion (slightly more if rapid mortality 
decline is anticipated). The Flat Fund Ratio tax (or Stable Infinite 
Horizon tax) would generate a Fund of 21 trillion in 2075 under the 
Trustees’ assumptions, which would be 71% of projected GDP in 2075. 
It would generate a Fund of 29 trillion if more rapid mortality decline 
were anticipated. For the Unstable Infinite Horizon, the Fund in 2075 
would be about twice these last sizes, and growing rapidly. Finally, with
a policy of gradual linear increase to a sustainable tax rate in 2075, a 
more modest Fund of 6 or 7 trillion would be accumulated under the 
two mortality projections. 
All these projections assume that Social Security operations do not 
affect labor productivity, GDP growth, or interest rates. However, either
a debt of a Fund in 2075 equal to GDP, or a substantially increased 
payroll tax rate, would be inconsistent with the this assumed 
independence. 
Conclusion
The 75-year Summary Actuarial Balance, on which policy discussions 
are currently based, measures solvency over the life times of current 
workers, but not over the lifetimes of the workers in coming decades 
who will pay for the retirement of current workers. We must assess 
system solvency for these workers as well. The sustainability and 
balance measures developed in this paper fill this need. Unlike the 
standard 75-year Actuarial Balance, they should require revision only 
when new information becomes available, and not because of the 
predictable change in valuation period as time passes. In particular, we
propose the Flat Fund Ratio as the basic measure of long-run solvency 
as a more suitable basis for policy discussions and public debate. 
Under the 2000 Trustees Report assumptions, the Flat Fund Ratio 
measure indicates that the system is 3.1% out of balance, and with 
more rapid mortality decline (which we believe more likely) the 
imbalance rises to 4.2%. These figures are substantially higher than 
the 75-Year Actuarial Balance measure of 1.89%.
There are a number of reasons why the Flat Fund Ratio measure is an 
appealing lower bound estimate of the imbalance. Its rationale is 
intuitive and consistent with common sense. It is a natural extension of
the current actuarial practices, and it does not require invoking the 
infinite horizon. It can be calculated from information that is already 
published annually in the Trustees Reports. It can be justified on the 
grounds that it if projections are born out over the next 75 years, no 
change in taxes or benefits would be needed in 2075; the system 
would be in sound financial shape. If taxes were raised in line with the 
75-year Actuarial Balance criterion, however, the system’s finances 
would be deteriorating rapidly in 2075. We also show that the Flat Fund
Ratio tax would achieve balance over the infinite horizon if the growth 
rate of costs were to remain constant after 2075, and taxable payroll 
were always to grow at that same rate. In reality, costs are projected 
to grow more rapidly than revenues after 2075, so the Flat Fund Ratio 
tax measure provides a low estimate of what is needed for 
sustainability. It makes the projected Trust Fund Ratio constant from 
2074 to 2075, but leaves it declining slowly thereafter. 
It has been convenient to calculate the immediate and permanent tax 
rate hike that would be necessary to achieve balance as a measure of 
imbalance. However, this is a simplifying convenience, and not a 
prescription for policy. Many kinds of changes in taxes or benefits, with
different timing, could be used to achieve balance, with differing 
intergenerational consequences. The measures developed in this paper
could be easily adapted to assess the sustainability of such policies. 
Although there is a serious imbalance in the long-run finances of the 
US Social Security system, the size of the imbalance is certainly 
manageable in relation to GDP. The Actuaries’ imbalance measure of 
1.89% of payroll amounts only to .76% of GDP on a continuing basis. 
According to the Flat Fund Ratio measure, with more rapid mortality 
decline, the 4.2% increase in the payroll tax rate would correspond to 
only 1.7% of GDP12 on a continuing basis. That is, if taxes were 
immediately and permanently raised by 1.7% of GDP today, the 
system would be put on a sustainable path. Recall, however, that the 
median imbalance in OECD countries is two and a half times as great 
as in the US, and that some countries have imbalances six times the 
size of that in the US. We have not been able to estimate the Flat Fund 
Ratio Tax for these other countries, but there is every reason to expect
that as for the US, it would indicate greater problems then are 
apparent from the 75-year Actuarial Balance measure reported in 
Roseveare et al (1996). For these countries, with their more generous 
pensions, longer life, lower fertility and earlier retirement, the fiscal 
problems will be far more painful to confront and resolve. 
12 See Table III.C2 of the Board of Trustees Report (2000).
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Appendix: Analytics of Sustainable Tax Measures
We define the following variables, all measured in real terms, net of 
inflation:
F(t): the level of the Social Security fund in year t
W(t): the taxable payroll in year t
C(t): the cost in year t for benefits and administration
I(t): the tax income in year t (payroll tax plus tax on benefits, but not
including interest)
r: the interest rate, which is taken equal to the rate earned on the 
Trust Fund.
: the current tax rate relative to payroll
: the size of a one time immediate and permanent increase in the 
payroll tax rate needed to achieve a stated goal, such as 75 year
Actuarial Balance (75AB), Flat Fund Ratio (F75), Stable Infinite 
Horizon (S) or Unstable Infinite Horizon (U). 
T: the time horizon for an evaluation, which can be finite or infinite
Additional notation will be introduced as necessary. 
1. Actuarial Balance 
Define the present values of income from taxes and of costs over a 
time horizon of T years. This presupposes a policy which specifies the 
tax rate and the costs of benefits over the horizon T. 
(A.1)
(A.2)
The actuarial balance over horizon T, relative to this policy, is defined 
as: 
(A.3)     
This is usually expressed as a proportion of the present value of 
taxable payroll over the same horizon, PV(W,T). We will call this 
proportion  , where  can be interpreted as the size of the 
immediate and permanent increase in the payroll tax rate (relative to 
the tax rate of the policy) which would achieve balance, or set AB(T) = 
0, leaving a fund at time T equal to the next year’s costs. In these 
expressions, T can take any positive value, including infinity. In the 
calculations of the Actuaries, T=75. 
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2. Actuarial Balance with an Infinite Time Horizon 
It will be useful to divide each infinite integral into two parts, the first 
over the time period for which a detailed projection is available, which 
is 75 years in the case of the Social Security system, and the second 
from this point to infinity, for which detailed projections are not 
available and a simplifying assumption must be made. The equation 
for the infinite horizon actuarial balance, given above with T=, can be
rewritten as: 
(A.4)
Inspection of the first two terms on the right indicates that this is the 
fund balance at time T, discounted to time 0, or . (Note that this
is almost identical to AB(T), differing only by the exclusion of the 
present value of one year’s costs at the end of the period, erTC(T+1)). 
This can be evaluated using data contained in the Trustees Report.13 
The infinite integral requires additional assumptions, as discussed in 
the text. 
1. Unstable Assumption: Assume that from T on, I(s) and C(s) grow at 
constant exponential rates  and , with both less than r. 
Substituting and simplifying, we find: 
(A.5)     
(A.6)
Relative to the present value of payroll, this is:
(A.7)     
Note that the AB and  are defined relative to a baseline policy, here 
taken to be continuation of current policy, and F, I, C and W all likewise
refer to this baseline policy. 
13 There are complexities related to tax income derived from taxation of benefits 
rather than taxation of payroll. We assume that income from the taxation of benefits 
in year s>T, (s), represented as a fraction of expenditures, remains constant. When 
growth rates of payroll and expenditures differ, (s), expressed in terms of an 
additional tax rate levied to payroll, will also grow at a constant rate of -. While 
incorporated in actual calculations, the representation of (s) was not included in this 
appendix to simplify the mathematical presentation.
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2. Stable Assumption: Both  grow at the constant 
exponential rate  less than r. In this case, the expressions derived 
above become: 
(A.8)     
(A.9)
3. The Flat Fund Ratio Criterion
Consider the stable infinite horizon case. Assuming balance, so that AB=0, 
we have:
(A.10)
The trust fund evolves according to
(A.11) . 
Combining these we get:
(A.12)     
Since, by assumption, C is also growing at the exponential rate , the 
Fund Ratio will be constant or flat after T, including the case where 
F(T)=0. This establishes that the Flat Fund Ratio after T is a necessary 
condition for balance over an infinite horizon, provided that the system
is stable after T. 
So a sustainable policy that achieves steady state will have the fund 
growing at the same rate as costs, and therefore the Flat Fund Ratio 
criterion will be satisfied after T. 
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Table 1. Estimates of Various Measures of Imbalance under the 
SSA(2000) Intermediate and Lee-Tuljapurkar Projections
Measure of Imbalance as 
Proportion of Present 
Value of Payroll
Imbalance as % PV 




SSA L-T SSA L-T
75 year Actuarial Balance 
(AB75)
.019 .024 3.08 3.94
Flat Fund Ratio .031 .042 6.90 9.65
Stable Infinite Horizon .031 .042 6.90 9.65
Unstable Infinite Horizon .037 .057 8.37 12.81
300 Year Projection .035 .046 7.76 10.11
Note: The column labeled SSA is based on data in the Trustees Report 
(2000). The column labeled L-T is based on median values from the 
Lee-Tuljapurkar stochastic projection for Social Security finances, with 
the long run means of key input variables constrained to equal the 
Intermediate assumptions of the Trustees Report (2000) except for 
mortality, which follows the Lee-Carter style mortality projections, 
leading to a median life expectancy of 86 for 2075. AB75 is measured 
relative to PV of payroll over 75 year horizon, and others are measured
relative to an infinite or 300 year horizon. See text for definitions of 
measures. 
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